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a b s t r a c t
Defined over sets of truth values V which are closed subsets of [0, 1] containing both 0
and 1, Gödel logics GV are prominent examples of many-valued logics. We investigate a
first-order fragment ofGV extendedwith∆, that is powerful enough to formalize important
properties of fuzzy rule-based systems. The satisfiability problem in this fragment is shown
to be NP-complete for all GV , also in the presence of an additional, involutive negation.
In contrast to the one-variable case, in the fragment considered, only two infinite-valued
Gödel logics extended with ∆ differ w.r.t. satisfiability. Only one of them enjoys the finite
model property.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Many-valued logics provide a foundation for reasoning in the presence of vagueness. The idea behind them is to extend
the scope of classical logic by considering sets of truth values larger than the usual {0, 1}. To this aim, various many-valued
systems have been defined. Among them, Gödel logics, GV , are the only ones that are completely specified by the order
structure of the underlying set V of truth values. This fact characterizes GV as logics of comparative truth and makes them
important formalizations of Fuzzy Logic; see [14].
The addition of the projection operator△, or of the classical (involutive) negation∼, enhances the expressive power of
Gödel logics and their applicability. For instance, Gödel logic with truth value set [0, 1] extended with ∼ is used in [9] to
formalize the rules of the fuzzy medical expert system CADIAG-2 [1].
In contrast with the propositional case, where there is only one infinite-valued Gödel logic w.r.t. tautologies and only
one set of satisfiable formulas [5], different infinite sets of truth values determine different first-order Gödel logics. Their
number has been settled to countable in [7], when considering the sets of tautologies. Nothing is known about the number
of different sets of satisfiable formulas, henceforth denoted by SAT-GV .
In this paper we investigate the satisfiability problem for a fragment of GV extended with △, which is a subset of both
the monadic and the one-variable fragment FO1(V). We call this fragment FO1mon(V). For formulas without △, satisfiability
in FO1mon(V) is equivalent to satisfiability in classical propositional logic.
To appreciate the usefulness of this fragment, notice that the formulas in [9] formalizing the system CADIAG-2 belong
to FO1mon(V). The fragment considered is also interesting from the mathematical point of view. Indeed, as shown in [4],
the presence of the modality △ (or of the negation ∼) renders the satisfiability problem for infinite-valued Gödel logics
undecidable already in the monadic case. In contrast with this result, here we prove that the satisfiability problem for
FO1mon(V) is decidable, and in fact NP-complete, for all Gödel logics. The proof distinguishes two cases determined by a simple
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topological property of the set of truth values V : 1 isolated and 1 non isolated in V . Prominent examples for the former case
being finite-valued Gödel logics (witnessed Gödel logics [15] can be treated in the sameway), while for the latter case, Gödel
logic with set of truth values [0, 1]. Despite its decidability, FO1mon(V) with 1 non isolated in V does not enjoy the finitemodel
property. Our results still hold when extending Gödel logics with the involutive negation∼. An algorithm to actually check
satisfiability in FO1mon(V) for Gödel logics with and without ∼ is presented. The algorithm is based on a reduction of the
problem to suitable propositional finite-valued Gödel logics.
Our decidability proof also shows that for V infinite, in contrast with monadic FO1(V) for which countably many distinct
sets of satisfiable formulas do exist, FO1mon(V) only exhibits two different sets of satisfiable formulas.
2. Preliminaries on Gödel logics
Introduced by Gödel in 1932 to show that intuitionistic logic does not have a characteristic finite matrix, Gödel logics
naturally turn up in a number of different contexts; among them fuzzy logic [14], Kripke frames [8], relevance logics [10],
the provability logic of Heyting arithmetic [19] and strong equivalence in logic programming [17].
To present their semantics, we consider below a standard first-order language L with finitely or countably many
predicate symbols P and finitely or countably many function symbols f for every finite arity k. In addition to the two
quantifiers ∀ and ∃ we use the connectives ∨, ∧,→ and the constant ⊥ (for ‘false’); other connectives are introduced as
abbreviations, in particular we let¬A := (A →⊥),⊤ := ¬⊥ and A ↔ B := (A → B) ∧ (B → A).
Definition 2.1 (Gödel Set). A Gödel set is a closed set V ⊆ [0, 1]which contains 0 and 1.
Let V be any Gödel set. The semantics of Gödel logic, with respect to V as truth value set and to a fixed language L of
predicate logic, is defined using the extended language LU , that is L extended with constant symbols for each element of
the universe U .
Definition 2.2 (Semantics of Gödel Logic). A V -interpretation (or simply interpretation) ϕ into V consists of
1. a nonempty set U = Uϕ , the ‘universe’ of ϕ,
2. for each k-ary predicate symbol P , a function Pϕ : Uk → V ,
3. for each k-ary function symbol f , a function f ϕ : Uk → U .
4. for each variable v, a value vϕ ∈ U .
Given an interpretation ϕ, we can naturally define a value tϕ ∈ U for any term t and a truth value ϕ(A) ∈ V for any
formula A ofLU . For a term t = f (u1, . . . , uk)we define ϕ(t) = f ϕ(uϕ1 , . . . , uϕk ) (dϕ = d, for all d ∈ U). For atomic formulas
A ≡ P(t1, . . . , tn), we define ϕ(A) = Pϕ(tϕ1 , . . . , tϕn ). For composite formulas A, ϕ(A) is inductively defined by:
ϕ(⊥) = 0
ϕ(A ∧ B) = min(ϕ(A), ϕ(B))
ϕ(A ∨ B) = max(ϕ(A), ϕ(B))
ϕ(A → B) =

1 ϕ(A) ≤ ϕ(B)
ϕ(B) otherwise
ϕ(∀x A(x)) = inf{ϕ(A(u)) : u ∈ U}
ϕ(∃x A(x)) = sup{ϕ(A(u)) : u ∈ U}.
(Here we use the fact that V is a closed subset of [0, 1] in order to be able to interpret ∀ and ∃ as inf and sup in V .)
Remark 2.3. When V = {0, 1}, ϕ is an interpretation of classical logic.
In Gödel logics, the validity of a formula depends only on the relative ordering and the topological type of the truth values
of atomic formulas, and not on their specific values. We recall the following definition from the theory of polish spaces
(see, e.g., [16]).
Definition 2.4 (Non Isolated Point). A non isolated point of a topological space is a point x such that for every open
neighborhood U of x there is a point y ∈ U with y ≠ x.
For each Gödel set we associate two sets of formulas: the set of tautologies and the set of satisfiable formulas. We refer to
the first set as logic in the traditional sense (closed under substitution, generalization and modus ponens).
Definition 2.5 (GV and SAT-GV ). For a Gödel set V we define the set of valid formulas GV (referred to as Gödel logic GV ) and
the set of satisfiable formulas SAT-GV as the set of formulas A of L such that ϕ(A) = 1 for all, respectively at least one,
V -interpretations ϕ. Each such interpretation is called amodel of A.
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Notice that in contrast with classical logic (that is Gödel logic with truth value set V = {0, 1}), in Gödel logics validity and
satisfiability are not dual concepts.1
Equivalence between formulas of Gödel logics are defined in the usual way, i.e., two formulas A and B are equivalent in
GV (A ≡GV B, in symbols) if for all V -interpretations ϕ, ϕ(A) = ϕ(B). The expression A
SAT≡GV B indicates that A is satisfiable
in GV if and only if so is B. (Henceforth we use≡ and SAT≡ when the logic considered is clear from the context.)
Proposition 2.6. Let V be any Gödel set. The following properties hold in each GV :
1. (A ∧ (B ∨ C)) ≡ ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C))
2. ∃x(A(x) ∧ Bx) ≡ (∃xA(x) ∧ Bx), where x does not occur free in Bx
3. ∀x(A(x) ∧ B(x)) ≡ (∀xA(x) ∧ ∀xB(x)).
2.1. Some extensions
Interesting extensions of Gödel logics GV are obtained by adding toL the unary operator△ of [2] or a classical, involutive
negation ∼, see e.g., [11,12]. We denote these extensions by G∆V and G∼V , respectively. The semantics of G∆V and G∼V extend
that of GV as follows (notice that the Gödel set V in G∼V has to be symmetric with respect to 1/2).
ϕ(△A) =

1 if ϕ(A) = 1
0 otherwise.
ϕ(∼A) = 1− ϕ(A).
Definitions and terminology for GV also apply to G∆V and G
∼
V .
Remark 2.7. In G∼V the operator△ is derivable (△A ≡ ¬∼A).
G∆V and G
∼
V are strictly more expressive than GV . E.g., unlike GV , in G
∆
V we can express ‘strict linear order’ as
¬△(B → A). (1)
Henceforthwedenote byA ≺ B the formula above. It is easy to see that for every interpretationϕ ofG∆V onehasϕ(A ≺ B) = 1
if and only if ϕ(A) < ϕ(B).
Proposition 2.8. Let V be any Gödel set, then ∀xB(x) SAT≡GV ∀x△B(x).
Notice that the corresponding statement does not hold for the existential quantifier. E.g., let B(x) be the formula A(x) ∧
∀x¬△A(x); ∃xB(x) is satisfiable in any G∆V in which 1 is non isolated in V while ∃x△B(x) is not.
2.2. (Un)decidability of the monadic fragment
Monadic logic is the fragment of first-order logicwith no function symbol and inwhich all predicates are unary. A general
investigation of the (un)decidability status for the validity and the satisfiability problem inmonadic Gödel logics was carried
out in [3,4], respectively.
[3] proved that with the possible exception of Gödel logic with truth values set V↑ = {1} ∪ {1 − 1k | k ≥ 1} (whose
(un)decidability status is left open), validity is undecidable when V is infinite.
[4] identified suitable conditions on the topological type of V which determine the decidability or undecidability of
SAT-GV in monadic Gödel logics. SAT-GV is decidable when 0 is an isolated point in V (i.e., 0 has Cantor–Bendixon rank
|0|CB = 0, see e.g., [16]). In the remaining monadic Gödel logics the presence of at least three predicate symbols, one of
which is a constant different from 0 or 1,makes SAT-GV undecidable.Moreoverwithout this constant predicate, the problem
remains undecidable for all monadic Gödel logics in which 0 is a limit point of limit points in V (i.e., |0|CB ≥ 2). Gödel logic
G[0,1], with V = [0, 1] (also known as Intuitionistic Fuzzy Logic [18]) being a prominent example. Only one Gödel logic is
left out from the classification; this is the logic with truth value set V↓ = {0} ∪ { 1k | k ≥ 1} for which the (un)decidability
status of SAT-GV↓ is left open.
The addition of△ renders both the validity and the satisfiability problem undecidable for all monadic G∆V (and therefore
G∼V ) with V infinite, in the presence of at least two predicate symbols. The problems remain undecidable even when we
restrict to prenex formulas2 [3,4].
3. The fragment FO1mon(V)
We introduce the class FO1mon(V) of formulas of Gödel logics and provide a suitable normal form for them. The defined
normal form will be crucial for the decidability proof in Section 4.2.
1 The duality holds instead when considering the notion of positive satisfiability: a formula A is positive satisfiable if there exists a V -interpretation ϕ
such that ϕ(A) > 0.
2 In general Gödel logics do not admit equivalent prenex formulas, see e.g. [6].
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Definition 3.1 (FO1mon(V)). The class FO
1
mon(V) consists of all closed formulas in the first-order languageL extendedwith△,
of the form
n
i=1
(∃xAi1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xAini(x) ∧ ∀xBi1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xBimi(x))
where each Aik, B
i
k is a monadic and quantifier-free formula containing no function and constant symbol.
Notice that FO1mon(V) is contained in the one-variable fragment (FO
1(V)). The satisfiability problem for formulas in FO1mon(V)
without △ is classically decidable. The proof proceeds as in the case of monadic GV in which 0 is isolated in V (see [4]).
Indeed
Proposition 3.2. Let V be any Gödel set. Formulas in FO1mon(V) without△ are satisfiable in GV if and only if they are satisfiable
in classical logic.
Proof. Let Q = ni=1(∃xAi1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xAini(x) ∧ ∀xBi1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xBimi(x)) be any formula in FO1mon(V) without△. If Q is
satisfiable in classical logic then clearly Q is satisfiable in GV . For the converse direction, consider any V -interpretation such
that ϕG(Q ) = 1. An interpretation ϕCL of classical logic such that ϕCL(Q ) = 1 is defined as follows: for any atomic formula P
ϕCL(P) =

1 if ϕG(P) > 0
0 otherwise.
Indeed, let Qi be any quantifier-free (sub)formula of Q . By induction on the complexity of Qi we can prove that ϕG(Qi) = 0
if and only if ϕCL(Qi) = 0 and ϕG(Qi) > 0 if and only if ϕCL(Qi) = 1. The claim easily follows. 
Notice that each formula in FO1mon(V) is equivalent in G
∆
V to a prenex formula with prefix ∃∗∀∗. Therefore, by Proposition 3.2,
FO1mon(V) without △ is contained in the Bernays–Schönfinkel class3 that, for classical logic is known to be effectively
propositional, i.e., its formulas canbe effectively translated into propositional logic formulas by replacing all existing variables
by Skolem constants and then grounding the universally quantified variables.
3.1. Chain normal form
A normal form similar to the disjunctive normal form of classical logic was introduced in [2] for formulas of propositional
Gödel logic. This normal form (called chain normal form) is extended below to formulas of FO1mon(V). The idea behind it
is to enumerate all the orderings of unary predicates over the same variable in a way similar to how one constructs a
disjunctive normal form by enumerating all possible truth value assignments of propositional atoms. Notice that, unlike
GV , these orderings are expressible by formulas of G∆V . We use below the following abbreviations (cf. Eq. (1))
A ≺ B for ¬△(B → A), and
A ≡∆ B for △(A → B) ∧△(B → A).
Definition 3.3 (△-chain). Let F be any formula in FO1mon(V) and P1, . . . , Pn be the predicates occurring in F . A△-chain over
F is any formula of the form
(⊥ on0 Pi1(x)) ∧ (Pi1(x) on1 Pi2(x)) ∧ (Pi2(x) on3 Pi3(x)) ∧ · · · ∧ (Pin(x) onn+1 ⊤)
where {Pi1 , . . . , Pin} = {P1, . . . , Pn}, i.e., every predicate symbol occurs exactly twice in the above formula, oni is either≺ or≡∆, and at least one of the oni’s is≺.
Every △-chain describes a possible ordering of the values of predicates of F . Let CF be the set of all △-chains over F , i.e.,
CF = {C1, . . . , CN} for N = (2n+1 − 1)n! (n! from the number of permutations of the predicate symbols, and 2n+1 − 1 from
the number of possible combinations of≺ and≡∆).
Every△-chain Ci induces equivalence classes over the predicates of F . These are ordered as
[⊥] = α0 ≺ α1 ≺ · · · ≺ αn = [⊤] with αi = {P i1(x), . . . , P iki(x)}
where P in(x) ≡∆ P im(x) for all n,m ∈ {1, . . . , ki} in Ci and at least one element in αi is related to at least one element in αi+1
with≺. Notice that the union of all αi is the set of all predicate symbols (plus⊤ and⊥) occurring in F , and the intersection
of any two αi is empty.
Furthermore, every interpretation uniquely defines a△-chain induced by the natural order of the valuations in the reals.
Lemma 3.4.

C∈CF C is a tautology in G
∆
V .
Every△-chain over F in FO1mon(V) induces a ‘syntactic evaluation’ of the (quantifier-free) formulas in F .
3 The Bernays–Schönfinkel class consists of formulas of the form ∃∗∀∗Awhere A is quantifier-free and no function symbol occurs.
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Definition 3.5 (Syntactic Evaluation). Let F be a formula in FO1mon(V) and A(x) any quantifier-free subformula of F . Its
evaluationΦCA(x) with respect to a△-chain C over F is defined inductively as follows:
Base case:
• for predicate symbols,⊤ and⊥ defineΦCP(x) as
ΦCP(x) =

⊤ if P(x) ∈ [⊤]
⊥ if P(x) ∈ [⊥]
P(x) otherwise.
Compound formulas:
• ΦC△A(x) is⊤ ifΦCA(x) = ⊤ andΦC△A(x) is⊥, otherwise.
• ΦCAk(x)∧Al(x) is eitherΦCAk(x) orΦCAl(x) depending on which of the two occurs earlier in the chain.• ΦCAk(x)∨Al(x) is eitherΦCAk(x) orΦCAl(x) depending on which of the two occurs later in the chain.• ΦCAk(x)→Al(x) is⊤ ifΦCAk(x) occurs earlier thanΦCAl(x) in the chain, otherwise it isΦCAl(x).
The syntactic evaluation of A(x) is a predicate symbol,⊤ or⊥ (when A(x) is a formula prefixed by△, thenΦCA(x) is either⊤
or⊥).ΦCA(x) is a syntactic evaluation of A(x) in the following sense.
Proposition 3.6. Let F be a formula in FO1mon(V) and A(x) be any quantifier-free subformula of F . For each interpretation ϕ of G
∆
V
and△-chain C over F
ϕ(C ∧ A(x)) = ϕ(C ∧ ΦCA(x)).
Proof. Let C be (⊥ on0 Pi1(x)) ∧ (Pi1(x) on1 Pi2(x)) ∧ · · · ∧ (Pin(x) onn ⊤) where {Pi1 , . . . , Pin} = {P1, . . . , Pn}. If for some
conjunct R on S in the chain C , ϕ(R) on∗ ϕ(S)where on∗ is=when on = ≺ or on∗ is<when on = ≡∆, then ϕ(C) = 0. The rest
follows by Definition 3.5. 
4. Decidability results
Weshow that the satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) is decidable for all Gödel logics.We consider two cases, distinguished
by the property that 1 is isolated in the truth value set V or it is not. All finite V being prominent examples of the first case,
while V = [0, 1] belongs to the second case. Though both cases are decidable, only FO1mon(V) in which 1 is isolated in V
enjoys the finite model property. These results also hold in the presence of the additional negation∼.
4.1. 1 isolated in V
In the presence of△, the satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) is not anymore equivalent to SAT in classical logic.
Example 4.1. The formula ∃x(¬¬A(x)∧¬△A(x)) is not satisfiable in classical logic while it is satisfiable inG∆V , for any Gödel
set V ≠ {0, 1}.
We showbelow that for anyGödel set V inwhich 1 is isolated (i.e., 1 has Cantor–Bendixon rank |1|CB = 0) the decidability
proof of the satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) proceeds similarly to that for classical formulas: by a process of grounding
and instantiation.
Lemma 4.2. Let V be any Gödel set in which 1 is isolated and Ai and Bj be quantifier free formulas of G∆V . Then
n
i=1
∃xAi(x) ∧ ∀xB(x) ∈ SAT-G∆V ⇔
n
i=1
Ai(di) ∧
n
i=1
B(di) ∈ SAT-G∆V
where the di are new constant symbols (Skolem constants).
Proof. (⇒) Assume that there is an interpretation ϕ such that ϕ(ni=1 ∃xAi(x)∧∀xB(x)) = 1. Then all the instances of B(u)
for u ∈ U will be evaluated to 1 under ϕ. Furthermore, due to ϕ(∃xAi(x)) = 1 for all i, and the isolation of 1 in V , for every i
there exists an object ui ∈ U such that ϕ(Ai(ui)) = 1. Thus, the interpretation that evaluates the Skolem constants di to the
elements ui, respectively, is a model for
n
i=1 Ai(di) ∧
n
i=1 B(di).
(⇐) The n-element universe together with the interpretation satisfying ni=1 Ai(di) ∧ ni=1 B(di) is a model ofn
i=1 ∃xAi(x) ∧ ∀xB(x). 
Theorem 4.3. The satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) in which 1 is isolated in V is decidable.
Proof. Let V be any Gödel set in which 1 is isolated and P be any formula in the class FO1mon(V). P is satisfiable in G
∆
V if and
only if so is one of its disjuncts. This has the general form
∃xA1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xAni(x) ∧ ∀xB1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xBmi(x) (2)
and it is equivalent to∃xA1(x)∧· · ·∧∃xAni(x)∧∀x(B1(x)∧· · ·∧Bmi(x))by Proposition 2.6. The claim follows by Proposition 2.8
and Lemma 4.2. 
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4.2. 1 non isolated in V
When 1 is non isolated in V , the satisfiability of an existential formula ∃xD(x) under any interpretation ϕ does not imply
anymore that there exists an element u of the domain such that ϕ(D(u)) = 1. Therefore the grounding process in Lemma 4.2
does not work and the decidability proof is more involved. This is also to be expected, as formulas in FO1mon(V), with 1 non
isolated in V , are not finitely controllable, that is not all satisfiable formulas have a finite model.
Example 4.4. The formula F in FO1mon(V)
∃xA(x) ∧ ∀x¬△A(x)
is satisfiable in G∆V where 1 is non isolated in V but it has no finite model (see Example 6.5).
Theorem 4.5. The satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) in which 1 is non isolated in V is decidable.
Proof. Let V be any Gödel set in which 1 is non isolated and F be any formula in the class FO1mon(V). First recall that F is
satisfiable if and only if so is one of its disjuncts, which has the general form of Eq. (2) (cf. Theorem 4.3). Consider, to fix
ideas, the case ni = mi = 1. The general case follows by easy adaptations. Let F be ∃xA(x) ∧ ∀xB(x). We first transform F
into a suitable equivalent formula using the chain-normal form. Consider ∃xA(x). By Lemma 3.4:
∃xA(x) ≡ ∃x

C∈CF
C

∧ A(x)

now we push in the existential quantifier (cf. Proposition 2.6)
≡

C∈CF
∃x(C ∧ A(x))
and evaluate the formula A(x)with respect to the chain C (cf. Proposition 3.6), syntactic evaluation
≡

C∈CF
∃x(C ∧ ΦCA(x)).
Some of the ΦCA(x) might be ⊥. We delete these disjuncts (keeping equivalence of satisfiability). The chains Ci leading to
‘syntactic evaluations’ΦCiA(x) different from⊥ are collected into the set
Γ = {Ci : i ∈ I}. (3)
Consider now the universal conjunct ∀xB(x) of F . By Proposition 2.8:
∀xB(x) SAT≡ ∀x△B(x).
Similarly as above, by using Lemma 3.4, Propositions 2.6 and 3.6 we obtain:
≡ ∀x

C∈CF
C

∧△B(x)

≡ ∀x

C∈CF
(C ∧△B(x))

≡ ∀x

C∈CF
(C ∧ ΦC△B(x))

.
As a formula with leading△ can only evaluate syntactically to⊥ or⊤ (cf. Definition 3.5), we remove the disjuncts with⊥
and arrive at
SAT≡ ∀x

C∈Σ
C

(4)
whereΣ ⊆ CF is the set of chains for whichΦC△B(x) = ⊤.
The original formula ∃xA(x)∧∀xB(x) has a model if and only if this holds for its SAT-equivalent formula (where Γ arises
from ∃xA(x), cf. Eq. (3))
F ′ :=

C∈Γ
∃x(C ∧ ΦCA(x)) ∧ ∀x

C∈Σ
C (5)
Claim: ∃xA(x) ∧ ∀xB(x) is satisfiable if and only if there is a△-chain C ∈ Γ ∩Σ .
We will refer to this condition as satisfiability condition.
(=⇒) Let ϕ be an evaluation satisfying the original formula. The△-chain ‘induced’ by this evaluation naturally satisfies
the condition above.
(⇐=) We show below that if the satisfiability condition holds, we can construct an interpretation ϕ of G∆V that is a model
for F ′ (and hence for the original formula F ).
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Fig. 1.Model construction, rkc = ϕ(Pk(c)) for Pk ∈ αk .
Indeed, let C be a △-chain matching the satisfiability condition above. Consider the equivalence classes over the
predicates of F induced by C . Assume that they are ordered as
[⊥] = α0 ≺ α1 ≺ · · · ≺ αn = [⊤] with αi = {P i1(x), . . . , P iki(x)}
Furthermore assume that the equivalence class ofΦCA(x) is αk, i.e.,Φ
C
A(x) ∈ αk.
By the property that 1 is non isolated in the truth value set, we can define the evaluation of atomic formulas on the
universe of natural numbers in a way that the following properties are fulfilled (for simplicity belowwe omit the subscripts
in P ij (x), and indicate only the respective equivalence class by the superscript):
(1) ϕ(P0(c)) = 0, for all c , which is necessary as all the P0(x) are in α0 = [⊥].
(2) if i < j then for all P i ∈ αi and P j ∈ αj and for all c , ϕ(P i(c)) < ϕ(P j(c)).
(3) if i ≥ k and P i ∈ αi, then limc→∞ ϕ(P i(c)) = 1
As an example, for V = [0, 1] a satisfying evaluation ϕ can be defined as
ϕ(P i(c)) = 1− 1
(c + 2)i (6)
For truth value sets other than [0, 1] (with 1 non isolated) we define the evaluation ϕ iteratively (cf. Fig. 1): for c = 0 select
the evaluations in the truth value set such that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied. Having defined the evaluations of P i(c)
select the evaluations of P i(c + 1) (for i ≥ k) above all the evaluations P i(c), i.e., above max{ϕ(P i(c)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ n}. This is
possible due to the fact that 1 is non isolated. Furthermore, we can again ensure conditions (1) and (2). Continuing this way
we only have to make sure that for all predicates P i with i ≥ k the maximums of the evaluations for c are actually having 1
as the limit (condition (3)). This is again possible being 1 non isolated in V .
We now evaluate in ϕ the formula F ′ that is SAT-equivalent to F . Due to conditions (1) and (2) the△-chain C is satisfied,
that is for all c , ϕ(C(c)) = 1. From this and the fact that C ∈ Σ (satisfiability condition) it follows that
ϕ

∀x

C∈Σ
C

= 1,
Considering thatΦCA(x) cannot be member of α0 = [⊥] (otherwise the△-chain C would not be part of Γ ) and by (3) we have
limc→∞ ϕ(ΦCA(x)(c)) = 1, thus
ϕ(∃x(C ∧ ΦCA(x)(x))) = 1.
Hence ϕ is a model for F ′ and therefore F is satisfiable.
The extension of the proof to the general case, i.e., to formulas of the form ∃xA1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xAn ∧ ∀xB1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xBm
(cf. Eq. (2)) is easy. As in the restricted case we obtain sets Γ1, . . . , Γn from each of the Ak, and setsΣ1, . . . ,Σm from the Bj.
The satisfiability condition for the general case is therefore
∃C ∈

1≤i≤n
Γi ∩

1≤j≤m
Σj
i.e., there has to be a common chain in all the solutions. The proof in the forward direction is trivial as a satisfying evaluation
provides one chain that fulfills this condition. For the reverse direction we proceed exactly as in the basic case.
The decidability of the satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) follows from the fact that the satisfiability condition is a finite
check over finite objects (i.e.△-chains). 
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Example 4.6. Consider the formulas
F := ∃xA(x) ∧ ∀x¬△A(x) and F := ∃x△A(x) ∧ ∀x¬△A(x)
F is satisfiable in G[0,1]. Indeed, ΓF = {A(x) ≡∆ ⊤, ⊥ ≺ A(x) ≺ ⊤} while ΣF = {⊥ ≺ A(x) ≺ ⊤, A(x) ≡∆ ⊥}. The chain
C := ⊥ ≺ A(x) ≺ ⊤meets the satisfiability condition.
F is not satisfiable in G[0,1]. Indeed, ΓF = {A(x) ≡∆ ⊤}whileΣF = ΣF .
Remark 4.7. In constructing the satisfying evaluation ϕ, the interpretations of the formulas P i(c) in all equivalence classes
(but [⊥]) could have been shifted closer and closer to 1 with increasing c. We instead did that only for formulas in the
equivalence classes αi with i ≥ k (cf. condition (3)), as this is used in the next section to make a similar proof working in the
presence of∼.
4.3. Adding the involutive negation
Thepresence of the involutive negationdoes not change the decidability results for the satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V).
The proof for the case 1 isolated in V proceeds exactly as that in Section 4.1. We show below how to modify the decidability
proof in Section 4.2 to deal with∼.
To define a chain normal form for formulas in FO1mon(V) with ∼ we allow the constant 12 as predicate constant in the
language and fix its evaluation under every interpretation to be 1/2.
Definition 4.8 (Literal). Let P(x) be an atomic formula. Both P(x) and∼ P(x) are called literals. We denote with Atom(L) the
atomic formula for the literal L, i.e., if L = P(x) or L = ∼ P(x), then in both cases Atom(L) = P(x).
Recall that when considering∼we require that the Gödel set V is symmetric with respect to the rational number 1/2. The
notion of△-chains is extended to∼-△-chains as follows:
Definition 4.9 (∼-△-chain). Let F be any formula in FO1mon(V) with ∼, let P1, . . . , Pn be the predicates occurring in F . A∼-△-chain over F is any formula of the form
(⊥ onn Ln) ∧ (Ln onn−1 Ln−1) ∧ · · · ∧

L1 on1
1
2

∧

1
2
on1 M1

∧ (M1 on2 M2) ∧ · · · ∧ (Mn onn ⊤)
such that
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Atom(Li) and Atom(Mi) are in {P1, . . . , Pn}, i.e., all the Li andMi are literals made from the P1, . . . , Pn,• for all i, Li and Mi are dual literals, i.e., if Li = P(x), then Mi = ∼P(x), and if Li = ∼P(x), then Mi = P(x), with
P ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn},• {Atom(L1), . . . ,Atom(Ln)} = {P1, . . . , Pn} (and thus also {Atom(M1), . . . ,Atom(Mn)} = {P1, . . . , Pn}),• oni is either≺ or≡∆, and at least one of the oni’s is≺.
Note that in∼-△-chains eachoni is mirrored on the left and right side w.r.t. 12 . This reflects the relation between dual literals.
Furthermore, the definition of syntactic evaluation (Def. 3.5) has to be extended for∼ by letting
• ΦC∼A(x) = ∼ΦCA(x)
As a consequence the structure of the equivalence classes induced by a∼-△-chain changes as follows
[⊥] = βn ≺ · · · ≺ β1 ≺
[
1
2
]
≺ α1 ≺ · · · ≺ αn = [⊤]
where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if αi = [Lk], then βi = [Mk], i.e., dual literals are representatives of equivalence classes with the
same index, but on different side of [ 12 ].
Proposition 4.10. Let F be any formula in FO1mon(V) with∼ and A(x) any quantifier-free subformula of F . For each interpretation
ϕ of G∼V and each∼-△-chain C over F
ϕ(C ∧ A(x)) = ϕ(C ∧ ΦCA(x))
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.6. 
Theorem 4.11. The satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) in G
∆
V extended with∼ is decidable for all V .
Proof. The case 1 isolated in V proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Assume that 1 is non isolated in V and F is the formula ∃xA(x)∧∀xB(x) of FO1mon(V) in G∼V . As in the proof of Theorem 4.5
(cf. Eq. (5)) F is satisfiable if and only if so is
F ′ =

C∈Γ
∃x(C ∧ ΦCA(x)) ∧ ∀x

C∈Σ
C
where Γ andΣ contain all∼-△-chains leading to ‘syntactic evaluations’ΦCiA(x) andΦCi△B(x), respectively, different from⊥.
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Claim: (satisfiability condition) F ′ is satisfiable if and only if
(sata) there is a∼-△-chain C ∈ Γ ∩Σ .
Moreover let
[⊥] = βn ≺ · · · ≺ β1 ≺
[
1
2
]
≺ α1 ≺ · · · ≺ αn = [⊤]
be the equivalence classes induced by this∼-△-chain C ,
(satb) the equivalence class ofΦCA(x) is αk for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n, i.e., [ΦCA(x)] > [ 12 ].
(⇐=) Condition (sata) is proved as in Theorem 4.5. Due to the fact that the valuations satisfies the existential quantifier,
the equivalence class of the syntactic evaluation ofA(x)needs to be between (the equivalence class of) 12 and (the equivalence
class of)⊤, which gives (satb).
(=⇒) When conditions (sata) and (satb) hold we can define an interpretation ϕ∼ that is a model for F ′ (and hence for F )
similarly to the interpretation ϕ in the proof of Theorem 4.5. Indeed let [ΦCA(x)] = αk. As in the case without∼, the idea is to
push to 1 all the equivalences classes αi greater or equal to αk, i.e., for which i ≥ k (see Remark 4.7). Due to the presence of
the constant 12 this can be achieved only if [ΦCA(x)] is strictly greater than [ 12 ]. This is guaranteed by condition (satb).
For the case V = [0, 1]we present below an explicit definition of the interpretation ϕ∼(P(c)), whose domain is the set of
natural numbers plus 12 (and n is the number of equivalence classes on each side of
1
2 arising from the satisfiability condition
above)
ϕ∼

1
2

= 1/2
ϕ∼(P(c)) = 1/2(1− i/n) if P(x) ∈ βi, i < k
ϕ∼(P(c)) = 1/c i · 1/2(1− i/n) if P(x) ∈ βi, i ≥ k
ϕ∼(P(c)) = 1− ϕ∼(∼P(c)) if P(x) ∈ αi.
It is easy to see that the following properties hold:
(1)′ ϕ∼(P(c)) = 0, for all c , if P(x) ∈ βn(= [⊥]).
(2)′ if i < j then for all P i ∈ αi and P j ∈ αj and for all c , ϕ∼(P i(c)) < ϕ∼(P j(c)) (and, symmetrically if i > j then for all P i ∈ βi
and P j ∈ βj, ϕ∼(P i(c)) < ϕ∼(P j(c))).
(3)′ if P(x) ∈ αi with i ≥ k, then limc→∞ ϕ∼(P(c)) = 1.
From the above properties easily follows that ϕ∼(F ′) = 1.
In the case of arbitrary (but symmetric) truth value sets we use the construction given in the proof of Theorem 4.5 for
the αi’s (with i ≥ k) and define the evaluations for all predicates in the symmetric equivalence classes βi by 1 minus the
evaluation of those in αi. Finally, the evaluations of the predicates in the remaining equivalence classes are chosen to satisfy
conditions (1)′ and (2)′.
The extension of the proof to the general case proceeds as in Theorem 4.5. 
Remark 4.12. The results in this section also hold when 1/2 is not in the Gödel set V . In this case we still require that
V is symmetric with respect to 1/2 and we define a ∼-△-chain as (⊥ onn Ln) ∧ · · · (L2 on2 L1) ∧ (L1 < M1) ∧ (M1 on2
M2) ∧ · · · ∧ (Mn onn ⊤).
5. On the number of SAT-G∆V
Consider the two sets of formulas associated to each truth value set V (cf. Definition 2.5). In propositional logic the choice
of any infinite subset of [0, 1] leads to the same set of valid formulas. The same holds for the set of satisfiable formulas, see
[5]. At the first-order level different infinite Gödel sets V induce instead different sets of valid and of satisfiable formulas. For
(validity) Gödel logics their number has been settled to countable in [7]. Nothing is known about the number of sets SAT-G∆V
of satisfiable formulas with infinite Gödel set V , in presence of△. We show below that these are at least countable, as this is
already the case when we restrict to monadic formulas of G∆V only containing one variable. In contrast with this result, the
decidability proofs in Section 4 also reveals that in FO1mon(V) only two infinite-valued Gödel logics extended with△ (or∼)
differ w.r.t. satisfiability.
Proposition 5.1. There are countably many distinct monadic and one-variable SAT-G∆V , with infinite Gödel set V .
Proof. For n ≥ 1 let Vn be the truth value set:
Vn = {0, 1} ∪

k
n+ 1 : 1 ≤ k ≤ n

∪

k
n+ 1 +
1
l(n+ 1) : 1 ≤ k ≤ n, l ≥ 2

Vn has exactly n accumulation points kn+1 strictly between 0 and 1. Each of them is the infimum of the points
k
n+1 + 1l(n+1) .
We show that SAT-G∆Vn , for n ≥ 1, are all different. Consider indeed the following formula
INFk := △(Ck ↔ ∀xPk(x)) ∧ ∀x(Ck ≺ Pk(x))
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(where↔ and ≺ are defined as in Section 2). INFk expresses that Ck is a proper infimum in the sense that under a given
evaluations ϕ, INFk evaluates to 1 if and only if the truth value of Ck is the infimum but not a minimum of the truth values
of Pk(c).
Using INFk we can now define the formulas
Fn := ⊥ ≺ C1 ∧ C1 ≺ C2 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn−1 ≺ Cn ∧ Cn ≺ ⊤ ∧
n
k=1
INFk
that distinguish SAT-G∆Vm . For each n ≥ 1, Fn expresses indeed the fact that there are at least n proper infimum in the open
interval (0, 1). It is easy to see that Fm ∈ SAT-G∆Vn , i.e., there is a Vn-interpretation satisfying Fm, if and only if n ≥ m.
The if part follows by the existence of more than m accumulation points in Vn while for the only if part notice that every
Vn-interpretation with n < m assigns to one of the INFk a value less than 1. 
In contrast with the above result, as an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.2 and the fact that there is only one set of
classically satisfiable formulas, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 5.2. There is only one SAT-GV in FO1mon(V) without△.
The decision methods given in Theorems 4.3 and 4.5 show that the only difference between the sets of formulas SAT-G∆V
in FO1mon(V) is the isolation of 1, which gives the following corollary:
Corollary 5.3. There are only two different SAT-G∆V in FO
1
mon(V).
6. Reduction to propositional satisfiability
We reduce the satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) to satisfiability in suitable propositional finite-valued Gödel logics. As
a corollary it follows that the satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) is NP-complete for all Gödel sets V , with or without the
involutive negation∼.
Definition 6.1 (Propositional Reduct). Let A be any formula in FO1mon(V) with or without∼. The propositional reduct Ap of A
is inductively defined as follows:
Pi(x)p = Pi (∗)p = ∗ for ∗ ∈

0, 1,
1
2

(∀xA)p = Ap (∃xA)p = Ap
(A ∗ B)p = Ap ∗ Bp for ∗ ∈ {∧,∨,→}
(∗A)p = ∗Ap for ∗ ∈ {¬,∼,∆}.
Henceforth we denote by G⋆∞ the propositional infinite-valued Gödel logic4 extended with ⋆ ∈ {△,∼}. The following
theorem reduces SAT for (first-order) formulas in FO1mon(V ) to SAT for propositional formulas.
Theorem 6.2. Let V be any infinite Gödel set,
F = ∀xA1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∀xAm(x) ∧ ∃xB1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xBn(x)
be any formula in FO1mon(V ) (with or without∼) and A = ∀x△(A1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ Am(x)).
1. If 1 is isolated in V , we have
F ∈ SAT-G⋆V if and only if Ap ∧ (∃xB1(x))p ∈ SAT-G⋆∞
AND . . . AND
Ap ∧ (∃xBn(x))p ∈ SAT-G⋆∞.
2. If 1 is non isolated in V , we have
F ∈ SAT-G⋆V if and only if Ap ∧ X1 ∈ SAT-G⋆∞
AND . . . AND
Ap ∧ Xn ∈ SAT-G⋆∞
where Xi = ¬¬(∃xBi(x))p, if ⋆ = △ and Xi = ¬∼((∃xBi(x)→ 12 )→ ∃xBi(x))p, when ⋆ = ∼.
3. If 1 is non isolated in V and F ∈ SAT-G⋆V, then
F is satisfiable in a finite model ↔ Ap ∧ (∃xBi(x))p ∈ SAT-G⋆∞ for all i = 1, . . . , n.
4 Recall that for propositional formulas all infinite-valued Gödel logics coincide.
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Proof. 1. Immediately follows by Lemma 4.2.
2. The satisfiability conditions in the proof of Theorems 4.5 and 4.11 correspond, on the propositional side, to the
satisfiability of Ap ∧ ¬¬(Bi(x))p (i.e., the syntactic evaluationΦCBi(x) evaluates to an atom not in the equivalence class of⊥),
for the case ⋆ = △, and to Xi = ¬∼((∃xBi(x)→ 12 )→ ∃xBi(x))p (i.e. the syntactic evaluationΦCBi(x) evaluates to an atom in
an equivalence class bigger than [ 12 ]), for the case ⋆ = ∼.
3. By Proposition 2.8, F is satisfiable in G∼V if and only if so is A ∧ ∃xB1(x) ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xBn(x). (=⇒) Let ϕf be a finite
interpretation that is a model for F . Then for each j = 1, . . . , n there exists cj in its domain such that ϕf (Bj(cj)) = 1.
Therefore all△(A1(ci)∧ · · · ∧Am(ci))∧ Bi(ci) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n are satisfiable in ϕf which induces the propositional evaluations
satisfying each Ap ∧ (∃xBi(x))p in G⋆∞. (⇐=) Assume that each Ap ∧ (∃xBi(x))p ∈ SAT-G⋆∞ and ϕ∞i is a model in G⋆∞. Let
P1, . . . , Pl be the atomic formulas in Ap ∧ Bpi , for all i = 1, . . . , n. A (finite) model for F in G⋆V is simply defined by taking
c1, . . . , cn as domain elements and assigning to each Pi(cj) a value in V which respects the ordering of the values ϕ∞j (Pi) for
all i = 1, . . . , l. 
The above theorem together with the proposition below allow us to reduce the satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) to a check
on propositional finite-valued Gödel logics. Henceforth Gk will stand for propositional Gödel logic with k truth values.
Lemma 6.3. Let A be a propositional formula containing n distinct variables.
A ∈ SAT-G⋆∞ iff A ∈ SAT-G∆n+2.
If A contains∼ then
A ∈ SAT-G⋆∞ iff A ∈ SAT-G∆2n+3.
Proof. In the presence of ∼ we have to consider, for each of the (n + 2) values, their negation w.r.t. ∼, i.e. for each x, also
1− x. These are 2n+ 2 (notice that 0 is the negation of 1, and vice versa) with in addition the value 1/2. 
Corollary 6.4. Let F be a formula in FO1mon(V ) containing n different predicates. F is satisfiable in G
∆
V (G
∼
V , respectively) if and
only if the corresponding propositional formulas in Theorem 6.2 are satisfiable in G△n+2 (G
∼
2n+3, respectively).
Example 6.5. Consider the formula F = ∃xA(x)∧ ∀x¬△A(x) of Example 4.4. If 1 is non isolated in V , then F is satisfiable in
GV iff (△¬△A) ∧ ¬¬A is satisfiable in G△∞. The satisfiability of the propositional formula can be checked in G△3 . Note that F
has no finite models being (△¬△A) ∧ A not satisfiable in G△∞.
Corollary 6.6. The satisfiability problem for FO1mon(V) with and without∼ is NP-complete.
Proof. The inclusion in the class NP follows by Corollary 6.4 and e.g., [13]. For the NP-completeness note that SAT in
propositional classical logic can be expressed as SAT in G△∞ by prefixing with△ each variable in the classical formula. 
Final remark
CADIAG-2 (Computer AssistedDIAGnosis) is a ‘MYCIN-like’ expert systemassisting in the differential diagnosis in internal
medicine, developed at the Medical University of Vienna. Its knowledge base contains more than 20.000 IF-THEN rules
expressing relationships between medical entities, e.g., patient’s symptoms and diagnoses. In most cases, the relationships
and the involved entities are not Boolean (yes/no). To check the representation of the medical knowledge in the system,
CADIAG-2’s rules were formalized in [9] as suitable formulas of G∼[0,1] belonging to the class FO1mon(V). The resulting
formalization is consistency preserving, that is the unsatisfiability in G∼[0,1] of the logical formulas implies the existence
of errors in the system’s rules. The (un)decidability status of the satisfiability problem for these formulas was left open.
Theorem 4.11 provides an answer to this question. Furthermore, Corollary 6.4 can be used to actually check the rules of
CADIAG-2. This calls first for the development of suitable provers and SAT solvers for propositional finite-valued Gödel
logics extended with∼, capable of handling the large set of logical formulas representing the system’ rules.
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